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A NEW LOGIC FOR THE NAIVE THEORY OF TRUTH
BEN MIDDLETON
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME
Abstract. I provide a sound and complete natural deduction system for a logic
intermediate between constant domain basic first-order logic and constant domain
intuitionistic first-order logic and show that the naive theory of truth is ω-consistent
in the logic.
1. Introduction
Let LT be the first-order language with primitive operators ⊤, ⊥, ∧, ∨, →, ∀, ∃
whose signature consists of a binary relation symbol = for identity, a unary relation
symbol T for truth, a constant symbol 0 for the number zero and an n-ary function
symbol fe for the n-ary primitive recursive function [e] with index e. We identify a
linguistic object with its godel code. The naive theory of truth (NT) consists of the
following LT -sentences (replace a schema with all of its LT -instances):
A1. ∀x x = x
A2. ∀x∀y(x = y → y = x)
A3. ∀x∀y∀z(x = y ∧ y = z → x = z)
Ie. ∀x∀y(
∧
i xi = yi → fe(x) = fe(y))
A4. ∀x∀y(x = y ∧ T (x)→ T (y))
A5. ∀x(s(x) = 0→ ⊥)
A6. ∀x∀y(s(x) = s(y)→ x = y)
De. the definition of fe for fe 6= s
Ind. ∀x[∀y(φ(y, x)→ φ(s(y), x))→ (φ(0, x)→ ∀yφ(y, x))]
TB. Tpφq↔ φ
1
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where pφq is the numeral for φ and φ↔ ψ abbreviates (φ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ). Closing
NT under classical first-order logic (CQL) results in the trivial theory. So if we
want to accept NT without being committed to everything, we need to weaken CQL.
Even if we weaken CQL to the point where NT becomes non-trivial, NT might still
behave undesirably in other respects. Most obviously, NT might be ω-inconsistent,
in the sense that either (1) NT implies φ(n˙) for every n but NT ∪ {∀vφ} explodes
or (2) NT implies ∃vφ but NT ∪ {φ(n˙)} explodes for every n. In this case, we
cannot interpret the quantifiers in NT as restricted to ω. Say that a subclassical
logic supports NT iff NT is ω-consistent in the logic (and hence non-trivial). The
research program of naive truth theory consists of mapping the space of subclassical
logics which support NT. In this paper, I contribute a new logic BQLRCD to the
research program. First defined model-theoretically by Restall (1994), BQLRCD is
obtained by (1) dropping the requirement on the Kripke models for constant domain
intuitionistic first-order logic that the accessibility relation is reflexive and (2) only
allowing reflexive worlds to serve as counterexamples to logical consequence. Thus,
BQL
R
CD is intermediate between constant domain basic first-order logic (see Middleton
(2020)) and constant domain intuitionistic first-order logic. I provide a sound and
complete natural deduction system for BQLRCD and show that BQL
R
CD satisfies the
disjunction and existence properties. I prove that NT is ω-consistent in BQLRCD by
building a standard model for NT. The standard model is built using a positive
version of the Brady construction due to Field, Lederman and Øgaard (2017). I
compare BQLRCD to positive versions of the logics endorsed by Beall (2009) and Field
(2003, 2008). BQLRCD is shown to be strictly stronger than the positive version of
Beall’s preferred logic and incomparable with the positive version of Field’s preferred
logic.
2. BQLRCD
2.1. Model Theory. Let L be a first-order language with primitive operators ⊤,
⊥, ∧, ∨, →, ∀, ∃. An L-model is a 4-tuple M = 〈W,≺,M, |·|〉 such that W is a non-
empty set (the set of worlds), ≺ is a transitive binary relation onW (the accessibility
relation), M is a non-empty set (the domain of quantification) and |·| is a function
(the interpretation function) whose domain is the signature of L such that |c| ∈ M ,
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|fn| :Mn →M and |Rn| : W → P(Mn), subject to the constraint that w ≺ u only if
|Rn|(w) ⊆ |Rn|(u). For a term t(v) ∈ L and a ∈ Mn, the denotation function |t|(a)
is defined recursively as follows:
|c|(a) = |c|
|vi|(a) = ai
|fn(t1, ..., tn)|(a) = |f
n|(|t1|(a), ..., |tn|(a)).
For a formula φ(v) ∈ L, a ∈ Mn and w ∈ W , the satisfaction relation M, w  φ(a)
is defined inductively as follows (suppressing M for brevity):
w  ⊤(a)
w  Rn(t1, ..., tn)(a) ⇐⇒ 〈|t1|(a), ..., |tn|(a)〉 ∈ |R
n|(w)
w  (φ ∧ ψ)(a) ⇐⇒ w  φ(a) and w  ψ(a)
w  (φ ∨ ψ)(a) ⇐⇒ w  φ(a) or w  ψ(a)
w  (φ→ ψ)(a) ⇐⇒ for all u ≻ w : if u  φ(a) then u  ψ(a)
w  ∃vφ(a) ⇐⇒ for some b ∈M : w  φ(a, b)
w  ∀vφ(a) ⇐⇒ for all b ∈M : w  φ(a, b).
It follows by omission that w 6 ⊥(a).
Theorem 1 (Persistence). If w  φ(a) and w ≺ u then u  φ(a).
Proof. An easy induction on the construction of L-formulas. 
For sentences Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L, we write Γ |= φ iff for every L-model M and every
reflexive world w ∈ M: w  Γ only if w  φ. BQLRCD is the logic defined by |=.
By restricting |= to reflexive worlds, we preserve modus ponens. On the other hand,
since a reflexive world may see an irreflexive world, we lose conditional proof. For
example, φ∧ (φ→ ψ) |= ψ but 6|= φ∧ (φ→ ψ)→ ψ. As we will see, however, BQLRCD
does validate a modified version of conditional proof.
Theorem 2 (Compactness). If Γ |= φ then Γ0 |= φ for some finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ.
Proof. Similar to the ultraproduct proof of compactness for classical first-order logic
(see e.g. Poizat (2000)). 
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Theorem 3 (Substitution of Equivalents). φ↔ ψ |= χ[φ]↔ χ[ψ].
Proof. An easy induction on the construction of χ[p]. 
Corollary 1 (Transparency). NT |= χ[Tpφq]↔ χ[φ].
Theorem 4 (Leibniz’s Law). NT |= ∀x∀y∀z(x = y ∧ φ(x, z)→ φ(y, z)).
Proof. An easy induction on the construction of L-formulas. 
2.2. Proof Theory. We formulate the natural deduction system for BQLRCD in the
extension L+ of L obtained by adding ω-many new constant symbols {ai}i∈ω to L
(the ai are used in proofs as names of arbitrarily chosen objects). Let Π be a proof-
tree with a leaf labelled by an undischarged occurrence φi of φ. We say φi is unsafe
in Π iff φi occupies the following position:
....
....
α
φi....
α→ β
β ........
The natural deduction system NBQLRCD for BQL
R
CD consists of all trees of (possi-
bly discharged) L+-sentences constructed in accordance with the following inference
rules, where (i) no unsafe occurrence of an open assumption may be discharged, (ii)
φ(ai) does not occur unsafely in the right main subproof of ∃-Elim, (iii) ai does not
occur in φ or in any open assumption in the main subproof of ∀-Int and (iv) ai does
not occur in φ, ψ or in any open assumption besides φ(ai) in the right main subproof
of ∃-Elim:1
[⊤] (⊤-Int)
⊥
φ
(⊥-Elim)
φ ψ
φ ∧ ψ
(∧-Int)
φ ∧ ψ
φ/ψ
(∧-Elim)
φ/ψ
φ ∨ ψ
(∨-Int) φ ∨ ψ
[φ]
....
χ
[ψ]
....
χ
χ (∨-Elim)
1By stipulating that only sentences are linked by inference rules, we determine which free variables,
if any, a subformula may contain (e.g. φ may not contain free variables in Internal ∀-Int).
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[φ]
....
ψ
φ→ ψ
(→-Int)
φ φ→ ψ
ψ
(→-Elim)
φ→ ψ ψ → χ
φ→ χ
(Internal Transitivity)
φ→ ψ φ→ χ
φ→ ψ ∧ χ
(Internal ∧-Int)
φ→ χ ψ → χ
φ ∨ ψ → χ
(Internal ∨-Elim)
∀v(φ→ ψ)
φ→ ∀vψ
(Internal ∀-Int)
∀v(φ→ ψ)
∃vφ→ ψ
(Internal ∃-Elim)
φ(ai)
∀vφ
(∀-Int)
∀vφ
φ(t)
(∀-Elim)
∀v(φ ∨ ψ)
φ ∨ ∀vψ
(CD)
φ(t)
∃vφ
(∃-Int)
∃vφ
[φ(ai)]....
ψ
ψ
(∃-Elim)
We write Γ ⊢ φ iff there exists a proof of φ from Γ in NBQLRCD. In order to prove
soundness, we generalize ⊢ to allow for two premise sets, writing Γ : Σ ⊢ φ iff there
exists a proof ρ of φ from Γ∪Σ in NBQLRCD such that if ψ occurs as an unsafe open
assumption in ρ then ψ ∈ Γ. Correspondingly, we write Γ : Σ |= φ iff for every
L-model M, every reflexive world w ∈M and every u ≻ w: if w  Γ and u  Σ then
u  φ.
Lemma 1 (Generalized Soundness). If Γ : Σ ⊢ φ then Γ : Σ |= φ.
Proof. By induction on the construction of proofs in NBQLRCD. The base case is
easy. The induction steps are also easy except for →-Elim and the rules containing
discharges.
→-Elim Suppose we have a proof of ψ from Γ : Σ whose final inference is→-Elim.
Then Γ : Σ ⊢ φ and Γ′ : Σ′ ⊢ φ → ψ for some Γ′ ∪ Σ′ ⊆ Γ. By the induction
hypothesis, Γ : Σ |= φ and Γ′ : Σ′ |= φ → ψ. Let w ≺ u for reflexive w. Suppose
w  Γ and u  Σ. Then u  φ. Also, w  Γ′ ∪ Σ′. So w  φ→ ψ. But then u  ψ.
→-Int Suppose we have a proof of φ → ψ from Γ : Σ whose final inference is
→-Int. Then Γ : Σ, φ ⊢ ψ. So, by the induction hypothesis, Γ : Σ, φ |= ψ. Let w ≺ u
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for reflexive w. Suppose w  Γ and u  Σ. Suppose z  φ for z ≻ u. Then, by
Persistence, z  Σ. Also, by transitivity, w ≺ z. So z  ψ. Hence u  φ→ ψ.
∨-Elim Suppose we have a proof of χ from Γ : Σ whose final inference is ∨-Elim.
Then Γ : Σ ⊢ φ ∨ ψ, Γ : Σ, φ ⊢ χ and Γ : Σ, ψ ⊢ χ. So, by the induction hypothesis,
Γ : Σ |= φ ∨ ψ, Γ : Σ, φ |= χ and Γ : Σ, ψ |= χ. Let w ≺ u for reflexive w. Suppose
w  Γ and u  Σ. Then u  φ ∨ ψ. So u  φ or u  ψ. In either case, u  χ.
∃-Elim Suppose we have a proof of ψ from Γ : Σ whose final inference is ∃-
Elim. Then Γ : Σ ⊢ ∃vφ and Γ′ : Σ′, φ(ai)  ψ for Γ′ ⊆ Γ, Σ′ ⊆ Σ such that
that ai 6∈ Γ′ ∪ Σ′ ∪ {φ, ψ}. So, by the induction hypothesis, Γ : Σ |= ∃vφ and
Γ′ : Σ′, φ(ai) |= ψ. Let w ≺ u for reflexive w. Suppose w  Γ and u  Σ. Then
u  ∃vφ. So u  φ(b) for some b ∈ dom(M). Let M[ai/b] be the L+-model obtained
from M by setting |ai| = b. Then M[ai/b], w  Γ′ and M[ai/b], u  Σ′ ∪ {φ(ai)}. So
M[ai/b], u  ψ. Hence M, u  ψ. 
Theorem 5 (Soundness). If Γ ⊢ φ then Γ |= φ.
Proof. Suppose Γ ⊢ φ. Then Γ : ∅ ⊢ φ. So, by generalized soundness, Γ : ∅ |= φ. But
then Γ |= φ. 
NBQLCD, the system which results from removing→-Elim fromNBQL
R
CD, is sound
and complete with respect to constant domain basic first-order logic (BQLCD), which
is the logic obtained by dropping the restriction on |= to reflexive worlds.2 We write
Γ ⊢[−1] φ iff there exists a proof of φ from Γ in NBQLCD. Note that, since NBQLCD
does not contain →-Elim, proofs in NBQLCD do not contain unsafe occurrences of
open assumptions. In order to prove completeness for ⊢, we show that a proof in
NBQLRCD can in a certain sense be “reduced” to a proof in NBQLCD. We first list
some facts about ⊢[−1] needed in the reduction proof.
Lemma 2 (Distribution). φ ∧ (ψ ∨ χ) ⊢[−1] (φ ∧ ψ) ∨ (φ ∧ χ).
Lemma 3 (Infinite Distribution). φ ∧ ∃vψ ⊢[−1] ∃v(φ ∧ ψ).
Lemma 4 (∧-Release). φ ∧ ψ → χ ⊢[−1] φ→ (ψ → χ).
Let φ abbreviate ⊤ → φ.
2Middleton (2020).
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Lemma 5 (∀-Embedding). ∀vnφ ⊢[−1] 
n∀vφ.
Proof. By induction on n. The base case n = 0 is trivial. For the induction step we
have
∀vn+1φ
⊤ → ∀vnφ
(Internal ∀-Int)
[∀vnφ]
.... (induction hypothesis)
n∀vφ
∀vnφ→ n∀vφ
n+1∀vφ

Lemma 6 (n∧-Int). nφ1, ...,nφm ⊢[−1] n
∧
i φi.
Proof. By induction on n. The base case n = 0 is trivial. For the induction step we
have
n+1φ1, ...,
n+1φm
Internal ∧-Ints
⊤ →
∧
i
nφi
[
∧
i
nφi]
∧-Elims
nφ1 ...
[
∧
i
nφi]
∧-Elims
nφm.... (induction hypothesis)
n
∧
i φi∧
i
nφi → 
n
∧
i φi
n+1
∧
i φi

Lemma 7 (n∧-Elim). n
∧
i φi ⊢[−1] 
nφj .
Proof. By induction on n. The base case n = 0 is trivial. For the induction step we
have
n+1
∧
i φi
[n
∧
i φi].... (induction hypothesis)
nφj
n
∧
i φi → 
nφj
n+1φj
(Internal Transitivity)

Lemma 8 (Boxing). If φ1, ..., φm ⊢[−1] ψ then nφ1, ...,nφm ⊢[−1] nψ.
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Proof. Suppose φ1, ..., φm ⊢[−1] ψ. We prove the lemma by induction on n. The base
case n = 0 is trivial. For the induction step we have
n+1φ1, ...,
n+1φm.... (
n∧-Int)
n+1
∧
i φi
[n
∧
i φi]....
nφ1 ...
[n
∧
i φi].... (
n∧-Elim)
nφm.... (induction hypothesis)
nψ
n
∧
i φi → 
nψ
n+1ψ
(Internal Transitivity)

For sentences Σ ⊆ L+, let NBQLCD(Σ[−1]) = NBQLCD and, for n ≥ 0, let
NBQLCD(Σ[n]) denote the natural deduction system obtained by adding the rule
φ
Σ
NBQLCD(Σ[n− 1])
φ→ ψ
ψ
to NBQLCD. Write Γ ⊢Σ[n] φ iff there exists a proof of φ from Γ in NBQLCD(Σ[n]).
The next lemma generalizes the corresponding lemma in Middleton (2020).3 To state
the lemma concisely, let
∧
∅ = ⊤.
Lemma 9 (Relative Deduction). For |Γ| < ω, n ≥ 0: if there exists a proof Π ∈
NBQLCD(Σ[n]) of φ from Σ
′ ∪ Γ such that every open assumption which occurs
unsafely in Π is contained in Σ′ then Σ′ ⊢[−1] 
n(
∧
Γ→ φ).
Proof. Suppose the lemma holds for all m < n. We prove by induction on the
construction of proofs in NBQLCD(Σ[n]) that the lemma holds for n.
Base Cases Suppose we have a one-line proof in NBQLCD(Σ[n]) of φ from Σ
′ ∪ Γ.
There are three cases to consider.
3Note, however, that the Relative Deduction lemma is stated incorrectly in Middleton (2020).
A correct statement of the lemma can be found in the arxiv version of the paper, accessible at
arxiv.org/abs/1907.07013.
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Case 1 φ = ⊤. Then
[⊤]
→-Ints
n(
∧
Γ→ ⊤)
is a proof of n(
∧
Γ→ φ) from Σ′ in NBQLCD.
Case 2 φ ∈ Σ′. Then
φ
→-Ints
n(
∧
Γ→ φ)
is a proof of n(
∧
Γ→ φ) from Σ′ in NBQLCD.
Case 3 φ ∈ Γ. Then
[
∧
Γ]
∧-Elims
φ∧
Γ→ φ
→-Ints
n(
∧
Γ→ φ)
is a proof of n(
∧
Γ→ φ) from Σ′ in NBQLCD.
Induction Steps There are seven cases to consider.
Case 1 Suppose we have a proof of the form
Σ′,Γ....
α
φ
in NBQLCD(Σ[n]), where the final inference is ⊥-Elim, ∧-Elim, ∨-Int, Internal ∀-Int,
Internal ∃-Elim, ∀-Elim, CD or ∃-Int. Then, by the induction hypothesis and Boxing
applied to Internal Transitivity, we can find a proof of the form
Σ′....
n(
∧
Γ→ α)
[α]
φ
α→ φ
→-Ints
n(α→ φ)
....
n(
∧
Γ→ φ)
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in NBQLCD.
Case 2 Suppose we have a proof of the form
Σ′,Γ....
α
Σ′,Γ....
β
φ
in NBQLCD(Σ[n]), where the final inference is ∧-Int, Internal Transitivity, Internal
∧-Int or Internal ∨-Elim. Then, by the induction hypothesis and Boxing applied to
Internal ∧-Int and Internal Transitivity, we can find a proof of the form
Σ′....
n(
∧
Γ→ α)
Σ′....
n(
∧
Γ→ β)
....
n(
∧
Γ→ α ∧ β)
[α ∧ β]
α
[α ∧ β]
β
φ
α ∧ β → φ
→-Ints
n(α ∧ β → φ)
....
n(
∧
Γ→ φ)
in NBQLCD.
Case 3 Suppose we have a proof of the form
Σ′,Γ....
α ∨ β
Σ′,Γ, [α]
....
φ
Σ′,Γ, [β]
....
φ
φ
in NBQLCD(Σ[n]). Since unsafe occurrences cannot be discharged, if α occurs un-
safely in the center main subproof then α ∈ Σ′, and the same goes for β in the right
main subproof. There are two subcases to consider.
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Subcase 1 Γ = ∅. Then, by the induction hypothesis and Boxing applied to Inter-
nal ∨-Elim and Internal Transitivity, we can find a proof of the form
Σ′....
n(⊤ → α ∨ β)
Σ′....
n(α→ φ)
Σ′....
n(β → φ)
....
n(α ∨ β → φ)
....
n(⊤ → φ)
in NBQLCD.
Subcase 2 Γ 6= ∅. Then, by Distribution, the induction hypothesis and Boxing
applied to Internal ∨-Elim and Internal Transitivity, we can find a proof of the form
∅....
n(
∧
Γ ∧ (α ∨ β)→ (
∧
Γ ∧ α) ∨ (
∧
Γ ∧ β))
Σ′....
n(
∧
Γ ∧ α→ φ)
Σ′....
n(
∧
Γ ∧ β → φ)
....
n((
∧
Γ ∧ α) ∨ (
∧
Γ ∧ β)→ φ)
....
n(
∧
Γ ∧ (α ∨ β)→ φ)
in NBQLCD. So, by the induction hypothesis and Boxing applied to Internal ∧-Int
and Internal Transitivity, we can find a proof of the form
∅....
n(
∧
Γ→
∧
Γ)
Σ′....
n(
∧
Γ→ α ∨ β)
....
n(
∧
Γ→
∧
Γ ∧ (α ∨ β))
Σ′....
n(
∧
Γ ∧ (α ∨ β)→ φ)
....
n(
∧
Γ→ φ)
in NBQLCD.
Case 4 Suppose we have a proof of the form
Σ′,Γ, [φ]
....
ψ
φ→ ψ
A NEW LOGIC FOR THE NAIVE THEORY OF TRUTH 12
in NBQLCD(Σ[n]). Since unsafe occurrences cannot be discharged, if φ occurs un-
safely in the main subproof then φ ∈ Σ′. There are two subcases to consider.
Subcase 1 Γ = ∅. Then, by the induction hypothesis, we can find a proof of the
form
Σ′....
n(φ→ ψ)
n(⊤ → (φ→ ψ))
(→-Int)
in NBQLCD.
Subcase 2 Γ 6= ∅. Then, by the induction hypothesis and Boxing applied to ∧-
Release, we can find a proof of the form
Σ′....
n(
∧
Γ ∧ φ→ ψ)
....
n(
∧
Γ→ (φ→ ψ))
in NBQLCD.
Case 5 Suppose we have a proof of the form
Σ′,Γ....
α
Σ′
NBQLCD(Σ[n− 1])
α→ φ
φ
in NBQLCD(Σ[n]). There are two subcases to consider.
Subcase 1 n = 0. Then, by the induction hypothesis, we can find a proof of the
form
Σ′....∧
Γ→ α
Σ′
NBQLCD
α→ φ∧
Γ→ φ
in NBQLCD.
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Subcase 2 n > 0. Then, by the outer induction hypothesis, Σ′ ⊢[−1] 
n−1(⊤ →
(α→ φ)). So, by the induction hypothesis and Boxing applied to Internal Transitiv-
ity, we can find a proof of the form
Σ′....
n(
∧
Γ→ α)
Σ′....
n(α→ φ)
....
n(
∧
Γ→ φ)
in NBQLCD.
Case 6 Suppose we have a proof of the form
Σ′,Γ....
φ(ai)
∀vφ
in NBQLCD(Σ[n]), where Σ
′ ⊆ Σ. Let Σ∗ ⊆ Σ′, Γ∗ ⊆ Γ contain exactly the open
assumptions in the main subproof. Then ai does not occur in Σ
∗ ∪ Γ∗ ∪ {φ}. So,
by the induction hypothesis, ∀-Embedding and Boxing applied to Internal ∀-Int and
Internal Transitivity, we can find a proof of the form
∅....
n(
∧
Γ→
∧
Γ∗)
Σ∗....
n(
∧
Γ∗ → φ(ai))
∀vn(
∧
Γ∗ → φ)
....
n∀v(
∧
Γ∗ → φ)
....
n(
∧
Γ∗ → ∀vφ)
....
n(
∧
Γ→ ∀vφ)
in NBQLCD.
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Case 7 Suppose we have a proof of the form
Σ′,Γ....
∃vψ
Σ′,Γ, [ψ(ai)]....
φ
φ
in NBQLCD(Σ[n]), where Σ
′ ⊆ Σ. Let Σ∗ ⊆ Σ′,Γ∗ ⊆ Γ contain exactly the open
assumptions in the right main subproof besides ψ(ai). Then ai does not occur in
Σ∗ ∪Γ∗ ∪{ψ, φ}. Furthermore, since ψ(ai) does not occur unsafely in the right main
subproof, Σ∗ contains all open assumptions which occur unsafely in the right main
subproof. There are two subcases.
Subcase 1 Γ∗ = ∅. Then, by the induction hypothesis, ∀-Embedding and Boxing
applied to Internal ∃-Elim and Internal Transitivity, we can find a proof of the form
Σ′....
n(
∧
Γ→ ∃vψ)
Σ∗....
n(ψ(ai)→ φ)
∀vn(ψ → φ)
....
n∀v(ψ → φ)
....
n(∃vψ → φ)
....
n(
∧
Γ→ φ)
in NBQLCD.
Subcase 2 Γ∗ 6= ∅. Then, by the induction hypothesis, Infinite Distribution, ∀-
Embedding and Boxing applied to Internal ∃-Elim and Internal Transitivity, we can
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find a proof of the form
∅....
n(
∧
Γ∗ ∧ ∃vψ → ∃v(
∧
Γ∗ ∧ ψ))
Σ∗....
n(
∧
Γ∗ ∧ ψ(ai)→ φ)
∀vn(
∧
Γ∗ ∧ ψ → φ)
....
n∀v(
∧
Γ∗ ∧ ψ → φ)
....
n(∃v(
∧
Γ∗ ∧ ψ)→ φ)
....
n(
∧
Γ∗ ∧ ∃vψ → φ)
in NBQLCD. So, by Boxing applied to Internal Transitivity, we can find a proof of
the form
∅....
n(
∧
Γ ∧ ∃vψ →
∧
Γ∗ ∧ ∃vψ)
Σ∗....
n(
∧
Γ∗ ∧ ∃vψ → φ)
....
n(
∧
Γ ∧ ∃vψ → φ)
in NBQLCD. Hence, by the induction hypothesis and Boxing applied to Internal
∧-Int and Internal Transitivity, we can find a proof of the form
∅....
n(
∧
Γ→
∧
Γ)
Σ′....
n(
∧
Γ→ ∃vψ)
....
n(
∧
Γ→
∧
Γ ∧ ∃vψ)
Σ∗....
n(
∧
Γ ∧ ∃vψ → φ)
....
n(
∧
Γ→ φ)
in NBQLCD. 
Corollary 2. For |Γ| < ω, n ≥ 0: if Σ,Γ ⊢Σ[n] φ then Σ ⊢[−1] 
n(
∧
Γ→ φ).
Theorem 6 (Reduction). If Γ ⊢ φ then Γ ⊢[−1] 
nφ for some n.
Proof. Suppose Γ ⊢ φ. Then, since proofs in NBQLRCD contain at most finitely many
applications of →-Elim, Γ ⊢Γ[n] φ for some n ≥ −1. If n = −1 then we’re done. So
suppose n ≥ 0. Then, by Relative Deduction, Γ ⊢[−1] n+1φ. 
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It follows from Reduction that all occurrences of →-Elim in a NBQLRCD-proof can
be “pushed down” to the bottom of the proof. The next two theorems are the key
to the completeness proof.
Theorem 7 (Unrestricted ∨-Elim). Suppose (1) Γ ⊢ φ ∨ ψ, (2) Γ, φ ⊢ χ and (3)
Γ, ψ ⊢ χ. Then Γ ⊢ χ.
Proof. By Reduction: Γ, φ ⊢[−1] 
nχ and Γ, ψ ⊢[−1] 
mχ for some n, m. Suppose
without loss that n ≤ m. Then, by repeated applications of →-Int, we get Γ, φ ⊢[−1]
mχ. Since all open occurrences of φ in the first proof and ψ in the second proof are
safe, an application of ∨-Elim gives us Γ ⊢ mχ. Repeated applications of →-Elim
then give us Γ ⊢ χ. 
Theorem 8 (Unrestricted ∃-Elim). Suppose (1) Γ ⊢ ∃vφ and (2) Σ, φ(ai) ⊢ ψ for
ai 6∈ Σ ∪ {φ, ψ}. Then Γ,Σ ⊢ ψ.
Proof. By Reduction: Σ, φ(ai) ⊢[−1] 
nψ for some n. Since all open occurrences of
φ(ai) are safe in this proof, an application of ∃-Elim gives us Γ ⊢ nψ. Repeated
applications of →-Elim then give us Γ ⊢ ψ. 
3. The Canonical Model
The canonical model for BQLRCD is identical to the canonical model for BQLCD
(defined in Middleton (2020)). I repeat the definition here for ease of reference. In
order to prove the existence of the canonical model, we need to temporarily assume
that L is countable. However, this does not result in a loss of generality, since we
can use compactness to leverage up our proof of completeness to L of arbitrary
cardinality. A set of sentences Γ ⊆ L+ is called a prime saturated BQLCD-theory iff
Γ satisfies the following properties:
(consistency) ⊥ 6∈ Γ
(BQLCD-closure) if Γ ⊢[−1] φ then φ ∈ Γ
(disjunction property) if φ ∨ ψ ∈ Γ then φ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ
(existence property) if ∃vφ ∈ Γ then φ(t) ∈ Γ for some t ∈ L+
(totality property) if φ(t) ∈ Γ for every t ∈ L+ then ∀vφ ∈ Γ.
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Let Sat(BQLCD) denote the set of prime saturated BQLCD-theories. The canonical
model C is the L+-model 〈Sat(BQLCD),≺, C, |·|〉 such that (1) Σ ≺ Γ iff for all φ, ψ:
if φ→ ψ ∈ Σ and φ ∈ Γ then ψ ∈ Γ, (2) C is the set of closed L+-terms and (3) we
have:
|c| = c
|fn|(t1, ..., tn) = f
n(t1, ..., tn)
|Rn|(Σ) = {〈t1, ..., tn〉 : R
n(t1, ..., tn) ∈ Σ}.
Proposition 1. C is a well-defined L+-model.
Proof. Middleton (2020). 
Lemma 10 (Truth). C,Σ  φ iff φ ∈ Σ.
Proof. Middleton (2020). (This is where the countability assumption is used). 
4. Completeness
Continue to suppose L is countable. Sat(BQLRCD), the set of prime saturated
BQL
R
CD-theories, is defined analogously to Sat(BQLCD). Note that Sat(BQL
R
CD) ⊆
Sat(BQLCD). Since Γ ∈ Sat(BQL
R
CD) is closed under modus ponens, Γ is reflexive in
the canonical model.
Lemma 11 (Extension). For Γ such that |{i : ai 6∈ Γ}| = ω: if Γ 6⊢ φ then there
exists Γ∗ ⊇ Γ such that Γ∗ ∈ Sat(BQLRCD) and φ 6∈ Γ
∗.
Proof. We can use Unrestricted ∨-Elim and Unrestricted ∃-Elim to run a similar
argument to the proof of the Belnap Extension Lemma (see e.g. Priest (2002) §6.2),
except we draw witnesses from {ai}i∈ω (given that L is countable, the assumption
that |{i : ai 6∈ Γ}| = ω ensures we never run out of witnesses). 
Now drop the assumption that L is countable. We prove that completeness holds
over the extended language L+.
Lemma 12 (Weak Completeness). For |Γ| < ω: if Γ |= φ then Γ ⊢ φ.
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Proof. Suppose Γ 6⊢ φ. Since |Γ| < ω, we can find a countable first-order language
L0 ⊆ L such that Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L
+
0 . A forteriori, there does not exist a proof in
NBQLRCD ↾ L
+
0 of φ from Γ. Since {i : ai 6∈ Γ} = ω, Extension gives Γ
∗ ⊇ Γ such that
Γ∗ ∈ Sat(BQLRCD) (where Sat(BQL
R
CD) is defined over L
+
0 ) and φ 6∈ Γ
∗. Let C be the
canonical model over L+0 . Then, by Truth: C,Γ
∗  Γ and C,Γ∗ 6 φ. Since Γ∗ ≺ Γ∗,
an arbitrary expansion of C to L+ gives Γ 6|= φ. 
Theorem 9 (Completeness). If Γ |= φ then Γ ⊢ φ.
Proof. Immediate from compactness and weak completeness. 
5. Disjunction and Existence Properties
We can use the canonical model to show that BQLRCD satisfies the disjunction and
existence properties over the base language L.
Lemma 13 (Intersection). For I 6= ∅, let {w} ∪ {ui}i∈I ⊆ M be such that (1)
|Rn|(w) =
⋂
i∈I |R
n|(ui), (2) every ui is reflexive, (3) w ≺ ui for every i and (4) if
w ≺ z and z 6= w then ui ≺ z for some i. Then, for φ(v) ∈ L \ {∨, ∃}: w  φ(a) iff
for all i: ui  φ(a).
Proof. By induction on the construction of L \ {∨, ∃}-formulas. The base case is
easy. The induction steps are also easy except for →.
→ =⇒ This direction follows from (3) and Persistence.
⇐= Suppose ui  (φ → ψ)(a) for all i. Suppose for a reductio that w 6 (φ →
ψ)(a). Then z  φ(a) and z 6 ψ(a) for some z ≻ w. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1 z 6= w. Then, by (4), ui ≺ z for some i. But then ui 6 (φ→ ψ)(a), which
is a contradiction.
Case 2 z = w. Then, by the induction hypothesis, ui  φ(a) for all i and uj 6 ψ(a)
for some j. But then, by (2), uj 6 (φ→ ψ)(a), which is a contradiction. 
Lemma 14 (Weak Disjunction Property). For Γ ⊆ L \ {∨, ∃} such that |Γ| ≤ ω: if
Γ ⊢ φ ∨ ψ then Γ ⊢ φ or Γ ⊢ ψ.
Proof. Suppose Γ 6⊢ φ and Γ 6⊢ ψ. Since |Γ| ≤ ω, we can find a countable first-
order language L0 ⊆ L such that Γ ∪ {φ, ψ} ⊆ L0. A forteriori, neither φ nor ψ
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is provable from Γ in NBQLRCD ↾ L
+
0 . Since {i : ai ∈ Γ} = ∅, Extension gives
Γφ,Γψ ∈ Sat(BQL
R
CD) (where Sat(BQL
R
CD) is defined over L
+
0 ) such that (1) Γ ⊆ Γφ
and φ 6∈ Γφ and (2) Γ ⊆ Γψ and ψ 6∈ Γψ. Let C be the canonical model over L
+
0 . Then,
by Truth, we have (1) C,Γφ  Γ and C,Γφ 6 φ and (2) C,Γψ  Γ and C,Γψ 6 ψ.
Let f(C) be a worlds-disjoint copy of C obtained by replacing every Σ ∈ Sat(BQLCD)
with f(Σ) and leaving everything else unchanged. Let Cφ denote the submodel of C
generated by Γφ and f(C)ψ denote the submodel of f(C) generated by f(Γψ). Then
both Cφ and f(C)ψ have reflexive roots. Consider the following L
+
0 -model:
w
Cφ f(C)ψ
where w is a new world such that |Rn|(w) = |Rn|(Γφ)∩|Rn|(f(Γψ)). By Intersection,
w  Γ. By Persistence, w 6 φ and w 6 ψ. So w 6 φ ∨ ψ. Hence, by soundness,
Γ 6⊢ φ ∨ ψ. 
Theorem 10 (Disjunction Property). For Γ ⊆ L \ {∨, ∃}: if Γ ⊢ φ ∨ ψ then Γ ⊢ φ
or Γ ⊢ ψ.
Proof. Immediate from the finiteness of proofs and the weak disjunction property. 
Lemma 15 (Weak Existence Property). Suppose L contains at least one constant
symbol. Then, for Γ ⊆ L \ {∨, ∃} such that |Γ| ≤ ω: Γ ⊢ ∃vφ only if Γ ⊢ φ(t) for
some t ∈ L.
Proof. Suppose Γ 6⊢ φ(t) for every t ∈ L. Suppose for a reductio that Γ ⊢ φ(t)
for some t ∈ L+. Then, since t = t0(ai) for some t0(u) ∈ L, we have by ∀-Int that
Γ ⊢ ∀uφ(t0). So Γ ⊢ φ(t0(c, ..., c)) for some c ∈ L, which is a contradiction. Therefore
Γ 6⊢ φ(t) for every t ∈ L+. Since |Γ| ≤ ω, we can find a countable first-order language
L0 ⊆ L such that Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L0. A forteriori, for all t ∈ L
+
0 , there does not exist a
proof of φ(t) from Γ in NBQLRCD ↾ L
+
0 . Since {i : ai ∈ Γ} = ∅, Extension gives us
a family {Γt}t∈L+
0
⊆ Sat(BQLRCD) (where Sat(BQL
R
CD) is defined over L
+
0 ) such that
Γ ⊆ Γt and φ(t) 6∈ Γt. Let C be the canonical model over L
+
0 . Then, by Truth:
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C,Γt  Γ and C,Γt 6 φ(t). Let {ft(C)}t∈L+
0
be a family of pairwise worlds-disjoint
copies of C such that ft(C) is obtained by replacing every Σ ∈ Sat(BQLCD) with
ft(Σ) and leaving everything else unchanged. Let ft(C)
∗ denote the submodel of
ft(C) generated by ft(Γt). Then ft(C)
∗ has a reflexive root. Consider the following
L+0 -model:
w
ft0(C)
∗ ft1(C)
∗ ft2(C)
∗
where w is a new world such that |Rn|(w) =
⋂
t∈L+
0
|Rn|(ft(Γt)). By Intersection,
w  Γ. By Persistence, w 6 φ(t) for all t ∈ L+0 . So w 6 ∃vφ. Hence, by soundness,
Γ 6⊢ ∃vφ. 
Theorem 11 (Existence Property). Suppose L contains at least one constant sym-
bol. Then, for Γ ⊆ L \ {∨, ∃}: Γ ⊢ ∃vφ only if Γ ⊢ φ(t) for some t ∈ L.
Proof. Immediate from the finiteness of proofs and the weak existence property. 
6. Recovering Classical Closure
Let XL = {∀v[φ ∨ (φ → ⊥)] : φ(v) ∈ L}. In this section, I show that we obtain
the classical closure of a set of L-sentences Γ by closing Γ∪XL under BQLRCD. Write
Γ |=IQLCD φ iff φ is a consequence of Γ in constant domain intuitionistic quantified
logic (IQLCD). Let 
L = {∀v(φ→ φ) : φ(v) ∈ L}.
Lemma 16. Γ |=IQLCD φ iff Γ ∪
L |= φ.
Proof. ⇐= Easy.
=⇒ We show by induction on the construction of proofs in the natural deduction
system N IQLCD for IQLCD that for all Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L
+: if φ is provable from Γ in
N IQLCD then Γ ∪ 
L ⊢ φ. The only non-trivial cases are ∨-Elim, →-Int and ∃-
Elim. ∨-Elim and ∃-Elim follow from Unrestricted ∨-Elim and Unrestricted ∃-Elim
respectively.
A NEW LOGIC FOR THE NAIVE THEORY OF TRUTH 21
→-Int Suppose we have a proof of φ → ψ(ai) from Γ in N IQLCD whose final
inference is →-Int. Then, by the induction hypothesis, Γ∪ {φ}∪L ⊢ ψ(ai). So, by
Reduction, Γ ∪ {φ} ∪ L ⊢[−1] 
nψ(ai) for some n. Since all open occurrences of φ
in this proof are safe, we can discharge them to obtain Γ ∪L ⊢ φ→ nψ(ai). But
L ⊢ nψ(ai)→ ψ(ai). So Γ ∪L ⊢ φ→ ψ(ai). 
Lemma 17. XL |= ∀v(φ→ φ) for all φ(v) ∈ L.
Proof. Suppose w  XL for reflexive w ∈ M. Suppose for a reductio that w 6
∀v(φ→ φ). Then w 6 (φ→ φ)(a) for some a ∈ dom(M). So there exists u ≻ w
such that u  φ(a) and u 6 φ(a). By Persistence, u  XL. So u  (φ → ⊥)(a).
But then u  ⊥. So w 6 ⊥ → ⊥. Hence w  ⊥, which is a contradiction. 
Write Γ |=CQL φ iff φ is a consequence of Γ is classical logic.
Theorem 12 (Classical Closure). Γ |=CQL φ iff Γ ∪ X
L |= φ.
Proof. We have
Γ |=CQL φ ⇐⇒ Γ ∪ X
L |=IQLCD φ
⇐⇒ Γ ∪ XL ∪L |= φ [Lemma 17]
⇐⇒ Γ ∪ XL |= φ [Lemma 18].

7. A Standard Model for NT
Let L = LT \ {T}. An L-model M is standard iff (1) dom(M) = ω, (2) |0| = 0,
(3) |fe| = [e] and (4) for every w ∈ M: | = |(w) = {〈n, n〉 : n ∈ ω}. A standard
L-model therefore consists of copies of the classical standard model N connected by
transitive arrows. For L∗ ⊇ L, an L∗-model M is standard iff the reduct of M to
L is standard. We say that a set of L∗-sentences Γ has a standard model iff there
exists a standard L∗-model M such that w  Γ for some reflexive w ∈ M. In this
section, I build a standard LT -model NRT for NT. It follows that NT is ω-consistent
in BQLRCD. I build N
R
T using the positive Brady construction, a two-valued version
of the Brady construction due to Field, Lederman and Øgaard (2017). The main
difference between the construction as presented by Field, Lederman and Øgaard
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(2017) and the construction as presented here is that we add a loop at the end. But
since Field, Lederman and Øgaard are working in the context of the naive theory of
classes, it is worth presenting the construction in full detail. The strategy is to start
with a standard LT -model consisting of a single blind world and then, one by one,
add irreflexive copies of N to an infinitely descending chain below the blind world. At
each stage, we fix the intended extension of T using a Kripke-like construction. As
we descend down the chain, fewer and fewer conditionals are satisfied, which removes
more and more counterexamples to modus ponens. Eventually, all counterexamples
to modus ponens are removed. At this point, we can add a loop without disturbing
the truth-value of any LT -sentence, thereby ensuring T keeps its intended extension.
7.1. The Construction. Let {Mα}α∈Ord be an increasing sequence of standard L-
models such that each Mα has the form
w0
w1
w2
wα
(we always suppose arrows in diagrams are transitive). We define an increasing se-
quence {MTα}α∈Ord of LT -expansions of the Mα by induction on α. Suppose |T |(wβ)
has already been defined for every β < α. For arbitrary X ⊆ ω, let MTα [X ] de-
note the object which would be obtained were we to set |T |(wα) = X . MTα [X ] is
not necessarily an LT -model, since we need not have X ⊆ |T |(wβ) for all β < α.
Nevertheless, we can still define satisfaction on MTα [X ] in the same way as a real
LT -model. Let Φα(X) = {φ : MTα [X ], wα  φ}.
Lemma 18 (Monotonicity). If X ⊆ Y then Φα(X) ⊆ Φα(Y ).
Proof. Suppose X ⊆ Y . We show by induction on the construction of LT -formulas
that MTα [X ], wα  φ(n) only if M
T
α [Y ], wα  φ(n).
A NEW LOGIC FOR THE NAIVE THEORY OF TRUTH 23
Base Cases The claim holds trivially for atomic φ 6= T (t). For φ = T (t) we have
M
T
α [X ], wα  T (t)(n) =⇒ |t|(n) ∈ X
=⇒ |t|(n) ∈ Y
=⇒ MTα [Y ], wα  T (t)(n).
Induction Steps The induction steps are standard except for →, which holds due to
the fact that wα is irreflexive. 
We can now define an increasing sequence of increasingly better extensions for T
at wα in the style of Kripke (1975):
Xα(0) = ∅
Xα(β + 1) = Φα(Xα(β))
Xα(γ) =
⋃
β<γ
Xα(β) for γ a limit.
Lemma 19 (Locally Increasing). If β ≤ β ′ then Xα(β) ⊆ Xα(β ′).
Proof. By induction on β. The base case β = 0 holds trivially.
Successor Step Suppose β + 1 ≤ β ′. There are two cases.
Case 1 β ′ is a successor. Then we have
β ≤ β ′ − 1 =⇒ Xα(β) ⊆ Xα(β
′ − 1) (induction hypothesis)
=⇒ Φα(Xα(β)) ⊆ Φα(Xα(β
′ − 1)) (Monotonicity)
=⇒ Xα(β + 1) ⊆ Xα(β
′).
Case 2 β ′ is a limit. Then, trivially, Xα(β + 1) ⊆ Xα(β ′).
Limit Step Suppose β ≤ β ′ for β a limit. Suppose n ∈ Xα(β). Then n ∈ Xα(β0)
for some β0 < β. By the induction hypothesis, Xα(β0) ⊆ Xα(β ′). So n ∈ Xα(β ′). 
Lemma 20 (Locally Convergent). There exists β such that Xα(β) = Xα(β
′) for all
β ′ ≥ β.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, by Locally Increasing, for every β there exists β ′ > β
such that Xα(β) ⊂ Xα(β ′), which contradicts the fact that
⋃
β∈OrdXα(β) is a set. 
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We then let |T |(wα) = Xα(α+), where α+ is the least β such that Xα(β) = Xα(β ′)
for all β ′ ≥ β. This completes the definition of MTα .
Lemma 21 (Closure). wα  φ iff φ ∈ |T |(wα).
Proof. We have
wα  φ ⇐⇒ φ ∈ Φα(|T |(wα))
⇐⇒ φ ∈ Φα(Xα(α
+))
⇐⇒ φ ∈ Xα(α
+ + 1)
⇐⇒ φ ∈ Xα(α
+)
⇐⇒ φ ∈ |T |(wα).

Lemma 22 (Globally Decreasing). If α ≤ β then |T |(wβ) ⊆ |T |(wα).
Proof. Suppose α ≤ β.
Subclaim 1. For all ξ : Xβ(ξ) ⊆ Xα(ξ).
Proof. By induction on ξ. The base case ξ = 0 holds trivially.
Successor Step Suppose Xβ(ξ) ⊆ Xα(ξ). Since α ≤ β, every conditional sat-
isfied at wβ is also satisfied at wα. So, by a similar argument to Monotonicity:
M
T
β [Xβ(ξ)], wβ  φ(n) only if M
T
α [Xα(ξ)], wα  φ(n). Therefore Xβ(ξ + 1) ⊆
Xα(ξ + 1).
Limit Step Let n ∈ Xβ(γ) for γ a limit. Then n ∈ Xβ(ξ) for some ξ < γ. By the
induction hypothesis, Xβ(ξ) ⊆ Xα(ξ). So n ∈ Xα(ξ) ⊆ Xα(γ). 
There are now two cases to consider.
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Case 1 β+ = α+ + ξ for some ordinal ξ. Then
|T |(wβ) = Xβ(β
+)
= Xβ(α
+ + ξ)
⊆ Xα(α
+ + ξ) (Subclaim 1)
= Xα(α
+)
= |T |(wα).
Case 2 α+ = β+ + ξ for some ordinal ξ. Then
|T |(wβ) = Xβ(β
+)
= Xβ(β
+ + ξ)
= Xβ(α
+)
⊆ Xα(α
+) (Subclaim 1)
= |T |(wα).

It follows from Globally Decreasing that MTα is in fact an LT -model. Accordingly,
M
T
α satisfies Persistence, which allows us to prove that we eventually reach an ordinal
α such that for all β ≥ α: wβ  φ(n) iff wα  φ(n). Let S(α) = {〈φ(v), 〈v〉, 〈n〉〉 :
wα  φ(n)}.
Lemma 23 (Globally Convergent). There exists α such that for all β ≥ α : S(β) =
S(α).
Proof. Suppose not. Then, by Persistence, for every α there exists β > α such that
S(β) ⊂ S(α), which contradicts the fact that S(0) is a set. 
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Let Θ denote the least α such that S(α) = S(β) for all β ≥ α. We define NRT to
be the LT -model obtained from MTΘ by adding a loop at Θ:
w0
w1
w2
wΘ
Note that for all n < ω, wn  
n+1⊥ but wn+1 6 
n+1⊥. Thus, Θ ≥ ω. In
fact, if we set <ωφ = ∃xT ˙xpφq then we have wω+n  n+1<ω⊥ but wω+n+1 6
n+1<ω⊥. Next we can set <ω2φ = <ω<ωφ and so on up to ω2, where we can
set <ω
2
φ = ∃xT ( ˙<ω)xpφq and keep going. So Θ will be located a decent way out
into the ordinals, although Θ < ω1 since S(0) is countable.
4 For our purposes, the
key point is that Θ > 0 and so w0 remains blind. As we will see, this causes the
conditional to behave somewhat unusually at wΘ.
Lemma 24 (Standard Model). NRT , wΘ  NT.
Proof. The only non-trivial axiom is TB.5 We need to verify that φ ∈ |T |(wΘ) iff
N
R
T , wΘ  φ. By Closure, it suffices to show that N
R
T , wΘ  φ(n) iff M
T
Θ, wΘ  φ(n),
which we prove by induction on the construction of LT -formulas. The base case is
easy. The induction steps are also easy except for →.
→ =⇒ This direction is trivial.
⇐= Suppose NRT , wΘ 6 (φ→ ψ)(n). Then N
R
T , wα  φ(n) and N
R
Θ, wα 6 ψ(n) for
some α ≤ Θ. If α < Θ then we’re done. Suppose α = Θ. Then, by the induction
hypothesis: MTΘ, wΘ  φ(n) and M
T
Θ, wΘ 6 ψ(n). So M
T
Θ+1, wΘ+1 6 (φ → ψ)(n).
But then MTΘ, wΘ 6 (φ→ ψ)(n). 
Theorem 13 (ω-Consistency). (1) If NT ⊢ φ(n˙) for all n then NT∪ {∀vφ} 6⊢ ⊥, (2)
if NT ⊢ ∃vφ then NT ∪ {φ(n˙)} 6⊢ ⊥ for some n.
4Θ can equivalently be characterized as the least α such that S(α) = S(α+ 1).
5Note, however, that although wΘ validates the induction schema in §1, wΘ does not validate
∀x[φ(0, x) ∧ ∀y(φ(y, x)→ φ(s(y), x))→ ∀yφ(y, x)].
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Proof. Immediate from Standard Model. 
Corollary 3 (Non-Triviality). NT 6⊢ ⊥.
7.2. Compositional Principles. It is easy to see that the following compositional
principles are true at wΘ in N
R
T :
(C1) ∀v[Tpt1(v˙) = t2(v˙)q↔ t1(v) = t2(v)]
(C2) ∀v[TpT (t(v˙))q↔ T (t(v))]
(C3) ∀x∀y[sent(x∧˙y) = 1˙→ (Tx∧˙y ↔ Tx ∧ Ty)]
(C4) ∀x∀y[sent(x∨˙y) = 1˙→ (Tx∨˙y ↔ Tx ∨ Ty)]
(C5) ∀x∀y[sent(x→˙y) = 1˙→ (Tx→˙y ↔ (Tx→ Ty))]
(C6) ∀x∀y[sent(∀˙xy) = 1˙→ (T ∀˙xy ↔ ∀zTy[z˙/x])]
(C7) ∀x∀y[sent(∃˙xy) = 1˙→ (T ∃˙xy ↔ ∃zTy[z˙/x])].
We can therefore add C1 – C7 to NT without violating ω-consistency.
7.3. Comparison to Classical Arithmetic. Classical arithmetic (CA) is the the-
ory {φ ∈ L : N |= φ}, where N is the classical standard model of arithmetic. Positive
Brady arithmetic (PBA) is the theory {φ ∈ L : NRT , wΘ  φ}. CA and PBA are
incomparable. For example,
0 = 0 ∧ ∀x(x = 0→ s(x) = 0)→ ∀x x = 0
belongs to CA but not PBA (since the antecedent is true and consequent false at w0)
and
(⊥ → ⊥)→ ⊥
belongs to PBA (since the antecedent is true only at w0) but not CA. CA and PBA
nevertheless agree on a large fragment of L-sentences. In particular, let C denote
the fragment of L obtained by deleting all L-formulas in which a conditional occurs
embedded inside the antecedent of another conditional.
Theorem 14. For all φ(v) ∈ C: N |= φ(n) iff NRT , wΘ  φ(n).
Proof. By induction on the construction of C. The only non-trivial case is →.
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→ =⇒ Suppose N |= (φ→ ψ)(n). There are two cases.
Case 1 N |= ψ(n). Then, by the induction hypothesis: NRT , wΘ  ψ(n). So, by
Persistence: NRT , wΘ  (φ→ ψ)(n).
Case 2 N 6|= φ(n). Then, since → 6∈ φ: NRT , wα 6 φ(n) for every α ≤ Θ. So
N
R
T , wΘ  (φ→ ψ)(n).
⇐= Suppose NRT , wΘ  (φ → ψ)(n). Then, since wΘ is reflexive: N
R
T , wΘ 6
φ(n) or NRT , wΘ  ψ(n). In either case, the induction hypothesis gives N |= (φ →
ψ)(n). 
Note that CA ∩ PBA 6⊆ C. In particular, the L-instances of the induction schema
for NT do not belong to C.
7.4. Generalizing Function. One of the motivations for including a truth predi-
cate in the object language is to be able to express the conjunction or disjunction of
a set {φi : i ∈ I} of LT -sentences by referencing some predicate θ(v) which defines
{φi : i ∈ I}. This is useful when we are not in a position to list the φi — either
because there are too many φi (including infinitely many) or we do not know which
φi lie in the extension of θ(v). T is able to perform this generalizing function in the
standard model. Let |θ(v)|α = {n : N
R
T , wα  θ(n)}.
Proposition 2. Suppose |θ(v)|Θ = {φi : i ∈ I}. Then ∃v(θ(v) ∧ T (v)) ∈ PBA iff for
some i ∈ I: φi ∈ PBA.
In order to express a conjunction using ∀v(θ(v) → T (v)), we require that |θ(v)|α
is constant over all α. This will be true when →, T 6∈ θ(v) but not true in general
when →∈ θ(v) or T ∈ θ(v).
Proposition 3. Suppose |θ(v)|α = {φi : i ∈ I} for all α ≤ Θ. Then ∀v(θ(v) →
T (v)) ∈ PBA iff for all i ∈ I: φi ∈ PBA.
We can use the hierarchy of  operators defined at the end of §7.1 to improve this
result.
Proposition 4. Suppose |θ(v)|α = {φi : i ∈ I} for all α ∈ [ω,Θ]. Then ∀v(θ(v) →
(T (v) ∨<ω⊥)) ∈ PBA iff for all i ∈ I: φi ∈ PBA.
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In particular, if T 6∈ θ(v) then |θ(v)|α will be constant over [ω,Θ]. Thus, we can
easily express the conjunction of a set defined by a purely arithmetical predicate.
8. The Strength of NT
8.1. Fixed-Points. The ω-consistency result would be uninteresting if it turned out
that NT did not imply the existence of fixed-points in BQLRCD.
Proposition 5 (Fixed-Point). For every LT -formula φ(x) there exists an LT -sentence
Fφ such that NT ⊢ Fφ ↔ φ(pFφq).
Proof. Take Fφ = ∃x[x = pφ(d(x))q∧φ(d(x))], where d is the symbol for the function
which maps an LT -formula ψ to ∃x(x = pψq ∧ ψ) and a non-formula to 0. Let
δ = φ(d(x)). We reason in NBQLRCD as follows:
NT....
d(pδq) = pFφq
[Fφ]
[ai = pδq ∧ φ(d(ai))]
NT....
LL
φ(d(pδq))
φ(d(pδq))
d(pδq) = pFφq ∧ φ(d(pδq))
NT....
LL
φ(pFφq)
Fφ → φ(pFφq)
∀x x = x
pδq = pδq
NT....
pFφq = d(pδq) [φ(pFφq)]
pFφq = d(pδq) ∧ φ(pFφq)
NT....
LL
φ(d(pδq))
pδq = pδq ∧ φ(d(pδq))
Fφ
φ(pFφq)→ Fφ
where LL stands for the relevant instance of Leibniz’s Law. 
8.2. Incomplete. We can use Fixed-Point to show that the closure of NT under
BQL
R
CD is a proper subset of PBA.
Theorem 15 (Incompleteness). There exists φ ∈ PBA such that NT 6⊢ φ.
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Proof. Let P (x) abbreviate ∃y proof(y, x) = 1˙, where proof is the symbol for the
characteristic function of the relation “y is a proof of x from NT in NBQLRCD”. By
Fixed-Point, NT ⊢ G ↔ (PpGq → ⊥) for some G. So NT 6⊢ G. Hence NRT , wα 6
PpGq for every α ≤ Θ. But then NRT , wΘ  PpGq→ ⊥. So N
R
T , wΘ  G. 
8.3. Comparison to Peano Arithmetic. Let PA0 = NT ∩ L. We obtain Peano
Arithmetic (PA) by closing PA0 under classical logic. Since ⊥ → ⊥ ∈ PA, it follows
from Fixed-Point that no non-trivial extension of NT implies all of PA in BQLRCD.
Proposition 6. NT ⊢ (⊥ → ⊥)→ ⊥.
Proof. By Fixed-Point, NT ⊢ C ↔ (TpCq → ⊥) for some C. Let w  NT for
reflexive w. Then, by transparency, w  C ↔ (C → ⊥). Let u ≻ w be such that
u  ⊥ → ⊥. Then u does not see a blind world. Suppose for a reductio that
u 6 ⊥. Then u is not blind. So, by Persistence, u 6 C and u 6 C → ⊥. But then
there exists z ≻ u such that z  C and z  C → ⊥. Hence z must be blind, which
is a contradiction. 
8.4. Non-Constructive. No computable extension of PA0 with a standard model
satisfies the disjunction property in BQLRCD. So, in particular, NT does not satisfy
the disjunction property in BQLRCD. The proof is identical to the proof in Aschieri
(2018) that PA0 does not satisfy the disjunction property in IQLCD. We need to
verify, however, that the steps of Aschieri’s argument go through in BQLRCD.
Lemma 25. PA0 ⊢ ∀x(x = 0 ∨ ∃y s(y) = x).
Proof. An easy induction on x inside PA0. 
Theorem 16 (Determinacy of Identity). PA0 ⊢ ∀x∀y[x = y ∨ (x = y → ⊥)].
Proof. Let Φ abbreviate ∃x s(x) = 0. By axiom A5, it suffices to show PA0 ⊢
∀x∀y[x = y ∨ (x = y → Φ)]. We prove this by induction on x inside PA0.
Base Case x = 0. An easy induction on y inside PA0.
Induction Step We reason inside PA0 as follows. Suppose ∀y[a = y ∨ (a = y →
Φ)]. Let b name an arbitrary object. Then a = b ∨ (a = b → Φ). In the first
case, s(a) = s(b). In the second case, since PA0 ⊢ s(a) = s(b) → a = b, an
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application of Internal Transitivity returns s(a) = s(b) → Φ. So in either case,
s(a) = s(b)∨ (s(a) = s(b)→ Φ). Furthermore, since neither disjunct occurs unsafely
in these cases, we can discharge all occurrences of the disjuncts and apply ∀-Int to
get ∀y[s(a) = s(y) ∨ (s(a) = s(y)→ Φ)].
By the previous lemma, PA0 ⊢ ∀x(x = 0 ∨ ∃y s(y) = x). Let c name an arbitrary
object. Then c = 0∨∃y s(y) = c. In the first case, s(a) = c→ Φ. In the second case,
we can use the proof in the previous paragraph to obtain s(a) = c∨ (s(a) = c→ Φ).
So, in either case, s(a) = c ∨ (s(a) = c → Φ). Furthermore, since neither disjunct
occurs unsafely in these cases, we can discharge all occurrences of the disjuncts and
apply ∀-Int to get ∀y[s(a) = y ∨ (s(a) = y → Φ)].
Finally, because our initial assumption does not occur unsafely in the proof we
have constructed, we can discharge it to obtain the desired induction step. 
Let T be the characteristic function of Kleene’s T-predicate (so T(n,m, k) has
value 1 if k is a halted computation constructed by algorithm n from input m, and
value 0 otherwise).
Corollary 4. PA0 ⊢ ∃xT˙(n˙, m˙, x) = 1˙ ∨ ∀x(T˙(n˙, m˙, x) = 1˙→ ⊥).
Proof. By the determinacy of identity, PA0 ⊢ ∀x[T˙(n˙, m˙, x) = 1˙∨ (T˙(n˙, m˙, x) = 1˙→
⊥)]. So PA0 ⊢ ∀x[∃xT˙(n˙, m˙, x) = 1˙ ∨ (T˙(n˙, m˙, x) = 1˙ → ⊥)]. But then, by CD,
PA0 ⊢ ∃xT˙(n˙, m˙, x) = 1˙ ∨ ∀x(T˙(n˙, m˙, x) = 1˙→ ⊥). 
Theorem 17. For any computable T ⊇ PA0: if T has a standard model then T does
not satisfy the disjunction property in BQLRCD.
Proof. Suppose for a reductio that T satisfies the disjunction property in BQLRCD.
Then, by the previous corollary, for any n andm we have either T ⊢ ∃xT˙(n˙, m˙, x) = 1˙
or T ⊢ ∀x(T˙(n˙, m˙, x) = 1˙ → ⊥). But then we can solve the halting problem by
searching through proofs in NBQLRCD, which is impossible. 
Let PA−0 denote the set obtained by deleting all instances of the induction schema
from PA0.
Theorem 18. PA−0 satisfies both the disjunction and existence properties in BQL
R
CD.
Proof. Immediate from Disjunction Property and Existence Property. 
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So the induction schema is the cause of non-constructivity in PA0.
9. Comparison to Existing Logics
The logics for naive truth theory endorsed by Beall (2009) and Field (2003, 2008)
are defined over the language obtained by adding a primitive negation operator ¬
to LT . Accordingly, I shall compare BQL
R
CD to the positive versions of these logics
obtained by deleting ¬ from the object language and, in the case of Field’s logic,
turning the three-valued evaluation scheme for→ into a simple satisfaction condition.
I verify that BQLRCD is strictly stronger than the positive version of Beall’s preferred
logic and incomparable with the positive version of Field’s preferred logic.
9.1. Positive Basic Relevant Logic. The positive version of Beall’s preferred logic
is known as positive basic relevant logic (B+). A model for B+ is 〈W,N,R,M, |·|〉,
where W is a non-empty set (the set of worlds), N ⊆W (the set of normal worlds),
R is a 3-place relation on W (the accessibility relation), M is a non-empty set (the
domain of quantification) and |·| is a function (the interpretation function) whose
domain is the signature of the object language such that that |c| ∈ M , |fn| : Mn →
M and |Rn|(w) ⊆ Mn. The satisfaction conditions for ⊤, ⊥, ∧, ∨, ∀, ∃ are as
expected. The satisfaction condition for → is given as follows:
w  (φ→ ψ)(a) ⇐⇒


w ∈ N and ∀u ∈ W : if u  φ(a) then u  ψ(a)
w 6∈ N and ∀u, v s.t.R(w, u, v) : if u  φ(a) then v  ψ(a).
We write Γ |=B+ φ iff for every B
+ model M[B+] and every normal world w ∈M[B+]:
w  Γ only if w  φ.
Proposition 7. If Γ |=B+ φ then Γ |= φ.
Proof. Suppose Γ 6|= φ. Then there exists reflexive w ∈ M such that w  Γ and
w 6 φ. Take the submodel of M generated by w. By setting N = {w} and R =
{〈u, z, z〉 : u ≺ z} we obtain a B+ countermodel. 
The inclusion is strict because the schema φ→ (ψ → φ) is valid in BQLRCD but not
in B+.
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9.2. Positive Field Logic. A model for the positive version of Field’s logic (F+) is
〈W, η,M, |·|〉, where W is a non-empty set (the set of worlds), η :W → PP(W ) (the
neighborhood function), M is a non-empty set (the domain of quantification) and |·|
is the interpretation function, defined as in a B+ model. In addition, η is required
to satisfy the following conditions:
(Non-Empty Neighborhoods) ∅ 6∈ η(w)
(Directed) if X, Y ∈ η(w) then Z ⊆ X ∩ Y for some Z ∈ η(w).
The satisfaction conditions for ⊤, ⊥, ∧, ∨, ∀, ∃ are as expected. The satisfaction
condition for → is given as follows:
w  (φ→ ψ)(a) ⇐⇒ ∃X ∈ η(w) s.t. ∀u ∈ X : if u  φ(a) then u  ψ(a).
Say that Y is interior to X iff Y ⊆ X and for all w ∈ Y , there exists Z ∈ η(w) such
that Z ⊆ X . A world w is normal iff w satisfies the following conditions:
(Self-Closeness) w ∈ X for every X ∈ η(w)
(Interior Neighborhoods) ∀X ∈ η(w) ∃Y ∈ η(w) s.t. Y is interior to X .
(Spillover) ∃X ∈ η(w) s.t. |Rn|(w) ⊆ |Rn|(u) for every u ∈ X
(M-Directed) if {Xa : a ∈M} ⊆ η(w) then Z ⊆
⋂
a∈M Xa for some Z ∈ η(w).
We write Γ |=F+ φ iff for every F
+ model M[F+] and every normal world w ∈M[F+]:
w  Γ only if w  φ. BQLRCD and F
+ and incomparable. First, the schema φ →
(ψ → φ) is valid in BQLRCD but not in F
+. Second, the rule
φ→ ⊥
φ→ ⊥
is valid in F+ but not in BQLRCD. This is due to the fact that Non-Empty Neigh-
borhoods rules out the possibility of a world where all conditionals are vacuously
true. Non-Empty Neighborhoods causes problems when we attempt to axiomatize
F
+. Write Γ |=
F
+
0
φ iff for every F+ model M[F+] and every (possibly non-normal)
world w ∈ M[F+], w  Γ only if w  φ. It would be nice to have φ |=F+
0
ψ only
if |=F+
0
φ → ψ, since this would give us a restricted form of conditional proof. This
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rule is invalid, however, since Field allows η(w) = ∅. Suppose, then, that we re-
quire η(w) 6= ∅. Non-Empty Neighborhoods now blocks the construction of Field’s
standard model,6 since the initial world w0 cannot be assigned a non-empty neighbor-
hood. But if we drop Non-Empty Neighborhoods then we can set η(w0) = {∅}. This
makes all conditionals vacuously true, rather than vacuously false, at w0. Neverthe-
less, we can run Field’s construction as before to obtain a standard model for NT
(although some sentences, e.g. the fixed-point for ⊤ → T (x), have their final truth-
value flipped). Let F+CP denote the logic obtained from F
+ be replacing Non-Empty
Neighborhoods by
(Non-Empty System) η(w) 6= ∅.
Proposition 8. If Γ |=
F
+
CP
φ then Γ |= φ.
Proof. Suppose Γ 6|= φ. Then there exists reflexive w ∈ M such that w  Γ and
w 6 φ. By setting η(u) = {{z : u ≺ z}}, we obtain an F+CP countermodel. 
The inclusion is strict because the schema φ→ (ψ → φ) is valid in BQLRCD but not
in F+CP .
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